The dramatic increase in the percentage of mutual funds lending equities suggests that lending fees are an increasingly important source of income for investment advisors. We find that funds that lend equities underperform otherwise similar funds in spite of lending income. The effect of lending is concentrated in funds that cannot act on the short-selling signal due investment restrictions set by the fund family to diversify their fund offerings across styles. Additionally, we find evidence consistent with family crosssubsidization through the sharing of the short selling demand information generated by equity lending. Our findings suggest that the family organization explains why fund managers lend, rather than sell, stocks with short selling demand.
Introduction
A securities lending program offers a unique opportunity for mutual funds to generate additional income. By lending the securities in their portfolio, funds earn both interest and appreciation on the collateral of loaned securities. However, borrowing demand from short sellers for a stock is a strong signal of future underperformance. While many investors cannot profit from this short-selling demand signal due to arbitrage limits, in particular the difficulty in borrowing the stock, fund managers who are long the stock of interest can sell it in order to benefit. Thus, it is an empirical question whether the income generated from security lending outweighs the potential improvement in a fund's performance if the manager sells the stock in response to a short-selling demand signal.
1 Using a sample of 1,924 active and 146 passive equity funds over the 1996-2008 period drawn from the SEC's N-SAR filings, we examine security lending practices and their impact on mutual fund performance. We find that 85% of the funds in our sample are allowed to lend, but only 42% are actually lending. This increase in the number of mutual funds that lend has made them an increasingly important source of lending inventory, representing almost a quarter of the over $12 trillion global securities lending inventory and double the percentage of inventory from US pension funds.
2 While the willingness to lend shares among U.S. mutual funds has increased dramatically over the sample period (from 15% of active funds in 1996 to 43% in 2008), we find that actively managed equity funds that lend securities underperform otherwise similar funds that do not lend. The four-factor risk-adjusted net return difference between funds that lend and those that do not lend is statistically and economically significant at between 0.5% and 1% per year. The findings are robust to the inclusion of many family-and fund-level controls, including style and fund fixed effects as well as propensity score matching methods. 1 Research that shows that short selling predicts future negative abnormal returns includes Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990) , Senchank and Starks (1993) , Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998) , Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) , Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) , D'Avolio (2002) , Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002) , Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) , Jones and Lamont (2002) , Lamont (2004) , Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) , Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) , Diether, Werner, and Lee (2009), and Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010) . 2 "Securities Lending Best Practices -A Guidance Paper for US Mutual Funds", 2012 , eSecLending, p.3, September 16, 2014 .
Additionally, we find that index funds that lend stocks do not underperform otherwise similar index funds as their risk-adjusted performance should not be affected by lending their holdings. Index funds tracking the same index have similar portfolio holdings and returns, and thus index funds that lend securities generate income that increase returns relative to other funds that do not lend. In contrast, active funds can have different holdings, and thus the underperformance of funds that lend securities can be driven endogenously by the holdings (i.e., funds lend the stocks that are demanded by short-sellers).
These results suggest that the underperformance of active funds is driven by demand effects, which is consistent with the findings of Kaplan, Moskowitz and Sensoy (2013) that the increase in lending supply does not adversely affect equity prices.
If the decision to lend shares is based on the demand from short sellers for a fund's stock holdings, our findings suggest that short sellers are better informed than fund managers. The idea that short sellers are better informed investors is not new, and it is supported by a host of both theoretical and empirical papers. 3 This indicates that funds that lend have a long position in the stocks that are most desired by short sellers. What is surprising about our fund performance results is that through their security lending operation, fund families and managers receive a clear signal about the demand by short sellers for the stocks in their portfolio but then fail to act on that signal by selling those stock holdings.
One potential explanation for the observed fund underperformance is that the security lending decision is made at the advisor level for family-wide reasons, which is consistent with the idea that family-level profit maximization concerns can dominate fund-level performance concerns (e.g., Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) , Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) , Reuter (2006) ). Anecdotally, larger fund families often diversify their product offerings across different investment objectives in order to maximize total assets under management and, in turn, family-wide profits. In describing the compensation system at the Massachusetts Financial Services fund family, Chief Investment Officer Kevin Parke explained this strategic consideration:
4 "…some types of stocks are always out of favor, and I want our managers to stay with those stocks, picking the best of the worst. When they come back into favor, MFS will be prepared for the inevitable surge in inflows. So I will continue to pay a manager well who is doing a good job in an out-of-favor fund. But they must stick to picking the best stocks in their respective category.
I'm not going to reward a value manager who beat her index by including tech stocks (when tech stocks were hot) in her portfolio. That is cheating. We need to build an excellent track record and expertise in each of our asset classes over the long run."
If a manager was allowed complete flexibility in managing their portfolio, decisions to purchase securities outside their investment objective or to switch into and out of cash could potentially harm the fund families' overall product strategy of which funds to offer in each investment objective. 5 If fund managers are restricted from selling stocks in a style in order to accommodate these family-wide strategic considerations, they might be unable to respond to the observed short-selling demand signal.
Consistent with this idea, we find that funds that lend securities are from larger fund families with fund offerings that are well diversified across investment objectives. Also consistent with these familywide considerations and the effectiveness of the family's product diversification strategy, we find that families with securities lending programs are better at retaining assets within the family (i.e., outflows from one fund are more likely to be recaptured as inflows to another fund in the family instead of leaving the family altogether).
To assess whether or not investment restrictions prevent these managers from acting on the shortselling signal, we construct an index of fund manager restrictions following Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) . We find that the underperformance of funds that lend stocks is concentrated among funds in which the manager faces more investment restrictions.
While it is difficult to assess a manager's motivation for selling a stock and to control for the aspects of the stock themselves, we employ an unique holdings-based test to show the robustness of our results.
Specifically, we examine fund holdings for a sample in which a manager simultaneously manages a fund that is allowed to lend securities and a fund that is not allowed. To assess the strategic implications of engaging in equity lending, we compare how the manager responds to stocks that are "hard-to-borrow" in the two different funds. We find that managers respond to a short-selling demand signal by selling the stock in their portfolio, but the effect is much larger in the fund that is prohibited from lending versus the fund that is allowed to lend. This result corroborates the interpretation of our findings that those funds that can act upon the information signal received from the stocks in high borrowing demand outperform funds that cannot.
Families may also benefit from security lending through sharing information inherent in the short selling demand signal among funds within the family. To the extent that equity lending generates valuable information, families may have some funds that lend securities so that other funds can trade based on that information. We test for this cross-subsidization by examining whether funds that have access to lending information through other funds in the same investment objective and family outperform otherwise similar funds in families without access to the same lending information. We find that funds with access to lending information within the family outperform funds without access to lending information by 4 to 6 basis points per month.
To further test the information cross-subsidization hypothesis, we run an analysis using fund holdings. We first identify across a fund family all stocks that go on "special" and are held by a fund within the family that lends equities. While this is a subset of all stocks that go on special, if equity lending provides information about borrowing/short selling demand, these are the securities about which the fund family has unique information. We then examine the performance of funds in the family that do not lend, but that hold these same stocks. Using propensity score methods, we match these non-lending funds that potentially learn about the short selling demand for their holdings through this intra-family channel, with non-lending funds that hold the same stock, but that do not have access to this lending information.
We find that non-lending funds with access to this intra-family information sell a larger percentage of their position than similar funds without this intra-family information channel regarding the stocks on special. This evidence is also consistent with the idea that the sharing of equity lending information within a family has family-wide benefits, thus helping to explain why mutual fund managers lend what they could sell. It is important to note that our tests of the information hypothesis use short-selling demand proxies that could be purchased by fund families and could therefore be classified as "public", at least for a certain cost. At the same time, these measures proxy for any unique private information that the family could generate from their security lending operations, including intra-daily indications of shortselling demand, unmet or unfulfilled demand (calls to the lending desk when all shares have been lent),
and information regarding the identity of borrowers/short-sellers.
We find little or no evidence for alternative explanations for the observed underperformance like agency costs associated with the use of an affiliated lender. Adams, Mansi, and Nishikawa (2011) examine the equity lending practices of index funds and the role of mutual fund boards and affiliated lending agents in negotiating what fraction of the security lending income is kept by the fund. They find that index funds with an affiliated lending agent generate less lending income consistent with agency problems inherent in negotiating with an affiliated agent. We examine whether the relation between performance and equity lending among active funds is explained by the impact of lending agent affiliation. We find that equity lending is more negatively related to performance for funds with affiliated lending agents, but this effect is statistically insignificant in the case of active funds.
Our paper contributes to the understanding of the determinants of mutual fund performance. The literature focuses on the performance consequences associated with portfolio holdings or long stock positions (e.g., Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) , Cremers and Petajisto (2009)) and only a few studies examine short stock positions. Agarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) find that mutual funds that implement hedge fund strategies outperform traditional mutual funds. Chen, Desai, and Krishnamurthy (2012) find that funds that short stocks as part of their investment strategy generate significant abnormal performance from both their long and short stock position.
We also contribute to the understanding the economics of security lending, in particular the relation between security lending and performance and the rationale of fund families in initiating security lending programs. Our paper is related to a recent paper by Kaplan, Moskowitz, and Sensoy (2013) that studies the effect on stock prices of a shock to the supply of lendable shares. They conducted an experiment for an anonymous money manager in [2008] [2009] and find that the returns to stocks that are made available to lend are no different from the other stocks, which suggests that funds can lend out their stocks to earn lending fees without fearing negative consequences for the value of their holdings.
Our paper provides new insights about the fund manager decision to lend shares by studying the impact of stock lending on the performance of a large sample of actively managed mutual funds over an extended period between 1996 and 2008, which contains periods of high and low demand for borrowing stocks. Our results indicate that, on average, equity lending is associated with negative fund performance.
Security lending can be a profitable business, but fund managers should be aware of the potential adverse effects on stock prices from securities lending. This result is not related to the effect of shorting supply on stock prices, but rather to how managers respond to borrowing demand because of the fund family organization. Our paper shows that the decision to lend is made out of strategic family-wide considerations, which is consistent with the idea that family-level profit maximization can dominate individual fund performance-maximization.
Data
Investment companies are required by the Investment Company Act of 1940 to file semiannual and annual N-SAR reports with the SEC. The N-SAR form includes 133 numbered questions related to the investment practices of each fund. The responses to these questions provide information on trading activities, including whether or not the fund is allowed by its prospectus to lend securities and whether or not it actually lends equities (question 70N) during the reporting period. Table A .1 in the Internet Appendix). 8 Our matched N-SAR-CRSP sample does not differ significantly from the CRSP sample in terms of the main fund characteristics such as fund size, age, expense ratio, and turnover.
We then match each fund to the CRSP mutual fund database to collect data on performance and fund characteristics. For funds with multiple share classes, we compute fund-level variables by aggregating across the different share classes and eliminating duplicate share classes. From our sample of U.S.
domestic equity funds, we also exclude sector funds, enhanced index funds, and funds with no style category. The final sample covers 2,070 funds, of which 1,924 are active funds and 146 are index funds.
The explanatory variables of interest are indicator variables that equal one for funds that are allowed to lend securities ("Security Lending Allowed") and funds that actually lend securities ("Security Lending Used") in each year. We also collect the income generated from lending ("Security Lending Income") and the collateral used to secure the security loan ("Security Lending Collateral") from the annual SEC N- We use several fund-level variables in our analysis. We obtain the holdings as reported in
Morningstar for the sample period 1996-2008 for the funds in our sample and calculate the value-6 A list of the questions and sub-questions is available at: http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/forms/N-SARdoc.htm. 7 Reporting began with a subset of funds in 1993 and was gradually phased in for all funds. All funds were required to report by the end of 1995. 8 Other studies that use the N-SAR data include Edelen (1999) , Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) , Reuter (2006) , Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2012) , and Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2012) .
weighted average short interest and institutional ownership of the stocks in the fund's portfolio. We calculate fund utilization, defined as the ratio of average short interest to institutional ownership for the stocks in the fund's portfolio. Fund utilization controls for the short-selling demand (as proxied by short interest) and the lending supply (as proxied by institutional ownership).
We also calculate a measure of fund manager investment restrictions. Following Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) , we construct a fund-level index of investment restrictions in each year using the N-SAR-B fund filings. The index is constructed using the answers to six questions on investment restrictions: (1) borrowing of money, (2) margin purchases, (3) short selling, (4) writing or investing in options on equities, (5) writing or investing in stock index futures, and (6) investments in restricted securities. We code the answers as dummy variables that equal one if the fund is restricted.
Restrictions are aggregated in three categories: use of leverage (1)- (3), derivatives (4)- (5), and illiquid assets (6). We take the average of the dummies within each category and then take an average of the three categories. The resulting restriction index is between zero and one, and a higher score indicates a more constrained fund.
9 Table 1 provides summary statistics for all the variables used in our analysis. The monthly fourfactor Carhart alphas are calculated using factor exposures estimated over the previous 36 months. The average four-factor alpha is slightly negative (14 basis points per month), which is consistent with previous studies. Fund characteristics include total net assets (TNA), net fund flow as a percentage of TNA, expense ratio, fund turnover, active share, age, and performance rank within the investment style category. The variables also include fund family characteristics such as family TNA, average family net flows, expense ratio and active share (of actively managed funds), and the percentage of index funds, 9 We also construct an alternative restriction index that includes the additional investment allowance/restriction questions in the N-SAR fillings: writing or investing in repurchase agreements, options on equities, options on debt securities, options on stock indices, interest rate futures, stock index futures, options on futures, options on stock index futures, other commodity futures; investments in restricted securities, shares of other investment companies, securities of foreign issuers; currency exchange transactions; loaning portfolio securities; borrowing of money; purchases/sales by certain exempted affiliated persons; margin purchases; and short selling. The results using this alternative index are similar to those presented in the paper.
subadvised funds, and funds sold through brokers in the family. Panel B of Table 2 shows the transition probabilities between the different security lending states.
During the sample period, 16% of active funds and 40% of index funds switch from prohibiting to allowing security lending. Less than 3% of the active and index funds switch from allowing to prohibiting security lending.
Security Lending and Fund Performance
In this section, we study the relation between security lending and fund performance. A fund generates additional income when it lends its stock holdings, but the short-selling/borrowing demand for a stock is a strong signal of future underperformance. It is an empirical question whether or not the income generated from stock lending outweighs the potential gain a manager could obtain by responding to this short-selling demand signal by selling the stock. We examine this trade-off through the analysis of the fund's risk-adjusted performance and equity lending.
Multivariate Regression Results
We first estimate panel regressions of monthly fund after-fee performance on the security lending used dummy and other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is the fund's monthly four-factor alphas. We control for short-selling demand and lending supply using the fund utilization variable. Other control variables include the expense ratio, total net assets (TNA), net flow, turnover, family TNA, and percentage of funds sold through brokers in the family. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level to correct for within-fund correlation. Table 3 The coefficients of the other fund characteristics are in line with previous studies. Fund size is negatively related to performance, while family size is positively related (Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) ). Expenses negatively impact performance (Malkiel (1995) , Carhart (1997), Gil-Bazo and RuizVerdu (2009)), and broker-sold funds underperform even after controlling for expenses (Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) ). It is interesting to note that the coefficient on the level of utilization of the fund's portfolio holdings is negative and significant, which is consistent with the evidence of a negative relation between short-selling demand and future stock performance.
To address the potential concern that the fund performance result is due to an omitted variable such as portfolio manager skill and style differences, columns (2)- (4) include investment style fixed effects, investment style-time fixed effects, and fund fixed effects, respectively. This controls for unobserved sources of fund heterogeneity and addresses the joint determination problem in which an unobserved time-invariant variable simultaneously determines fund performance and fund characteristics. The economic magnitude of the security lending effect on performance remains sizable in all specifications.
Columns (1)- (4) use a sample that includes both funds that are allowed to lend securities and funds that are not allowed. If funds that allow security lending are systematically different from funds that prohibit lending, the results could be spurious. To address this concern, columns (5)-(8) present estimates using only the sample of active funds that are allowed to engage in security lending, that is, excluding funds that are prohibited from lending. Similar to the previous results, we find that funds that lend out securities underperform similar funds that are allowed to lend but refrain of doing so by four to seven basis points per month. Overall, the results on the sample of active funds suggests that the adverse effects on fund performance from continuing to hold stocks with strong short-selling demand outweighs the additional income generated by lending these stocks.
While managers of active funds have discretion over whether or not to buy, sell or hold a given stock, index fund managers have much less discretion. Because their objective is to track as closely as possible the performance of their stated index, passive fund managers likely do not focus on the future out-or underperformance of a stock, but rather they focus on whether or not it belongs to the index they are tracking. Given this fundamentally different motivation for buying, selling or holding stocks, index funds serve as an important robustness check throughout our analysis. If our interpretation of the findings for active funds is correct, we should not find a negative relationship between security lending and the performance of index funds. To assess whether or not this is the case, we separately estimate the security lending used coefficient for the sample of index funds. Panel B of Table 3 presents the results. Consistent with our interpretation, the security lending used variable is statistically insignificant in all specifications.
Propensity Score Matching Results
Matching methods alleviate some of the concerns associated with linear regressions and mitigate asymptotic biases arising from self-selection. We use propensity score matching to compare the difference in performance of both active and index funds that lend securities (treated sample) with funds that do not lend securities (control sample). We estimate a probit of the fund's decision to lend securities (dependent variable is the security lending used dummy variable) based on family and fund characteristics. In each month, we match each fund that lends securities with a fund that does not lend securities with the closest propensity score (nearest neighbor estimator) in the same investment objective (in the case of active funds) or tracking the same underlying benchmark (in the case of index funds). Table 4 reports the estimates of the probit of the fund security lending decision. Columns (1) and (2) use the sample of active funds, while columns (3) and (4) use the sample of index funds. Similar to Table   3 , columns (1) and (3) include funds that are not allowed to lend securities and in columns (2) and (4) the sample is limited to those funds that are allowed to lend securities.
In addition to providing a basis for selecting the control sample, the probit provides insight into the economics behind securities lending. For the sample of active funds, larger funds with lower flows from larger fund families in which less funds are sold through brokers are more likely to initiate a security lending program. Families with lower average fund performance, as measured by the average fund performance rank within the investment objective, are also more likely to initiate a security lending program. Families with lower average active share across funds are also more likely to allow lending.
Perhaps, not surprisingly, funds with a higher utilization rate are more likely to lend as well.
Families with more diverse fund offerings across investment objectives, as proxied by the Herfindahl index of total net assets (TNA) in each investment objective, are more likely to allow security lending.
The results suggest that initiating a security lending program is a family-wide decision related, in part, to the diversification of the family's overall product offerings across investment objectives. These results are consistent with Rizova (2012) that shows that security lending is a family-level decision driven by economies of scale and past performance.
For index funds, the fund size, family size and net flow results are similar. However, the results in column (4) with only funds that are allowed to lend indicate that index funds that lend shares are more likely to come from a family with offerings concentrated in an investment objective. Given the disproportionate size of index funds tracking the S&P 500, this result may arise from families with index fund operations concentrated in large cap investment objectives. Table 5 shows a comparison of average fund performance and characteristics between the treated and non-treated samples and between the treated and control samples. The control samples for the active and index funds are identified using the probit estimates from regressions (2) and (4) of Table 4, respectively. Panel A of Table 5 presents the comparison for active funds and Panel B presents the comparison for index funds. Table 5 confirms the results of Table 4 for both active and index funds. The average active fund in the treated sample has a negative four-factor alpha of 18.3 basis points per month and the average fund in the control sample has a negative alpha of 14.5 basis points per month. The estimated effect on riskadjusted performance of security lending is a statistically significant 3.8 basis points per month, which is similar to our previous estimates. For index funds, there is a negative and statistically insignificant difference when comparing the treated to non-treated samples, but when using the control sample, the difference is positive and statistically insignificant at 1.8 basis points. Looking at the other variables in Table 5 , we see that there are significant differences between the treated and non-treated samples, but the control sample constructed using the propensity score matching method is closer to the treated sample for the majority of fund characteristics. 10 As a robustness check, we also run a regression of the differences in four-factor alpha performance between treated and propensity score matched control funds but controlling for the characteristics with statistically significant differences. The differences (untabulated) in four-factor alphas are similar at -3.2 basis points for active funds and 1 basis point for index funds.
Effect of Investment Restrictions and Affiliated Lending Agents
We have shown that actively managed funds that lend securities underperform otherwise similar funds that do not lend securities. This is perhaps not surprising given the documented relation between short-selling demand and the future underperformance of a stock. What is surprising is that fund managers receive a clear signal about the demand by short sellers for their stock holdings but then choose to lend the stocks instead of selling them in anticipation of the future price decrease. Why would they fail to act upon this signal?
One potential explanation is that fund managers might be limited in their ability to act upon the information signal. Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) show that management companies confine managers' investment decisions through the use of various restrictions. In the N-SAR form (question 70N) mutual funds are asked to provide information on their investment activities and whether or not they are prohibited from using certain investment strategies. Following Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) , we compute an index of the investment restrictions that a manager faces in the usage of leverage, derivatives, and illiquid assets. The value of the index ranges between zero and one, and a higher score indicates a more restricted fund (see Table A .2 in the Appendix for a detailed description). We interact the restriction index with the security lending used dummy variable to see how investment restrictions affect the relation between fund performance and security lending. If this channel explains our findings, we should find that the interaction variable coefficient is negative and significant. Table 6 presents the estimate of performance regressions similar to those in Table 3 with additional explanatory variables. The samples includes only active funds and the specification includes style-time fixed effects. 11 Column (1) includes the interaction between the security lending used dummy and the restriction index. The coefficient on the interaction between the security lending used dummy variable and the restrictions index is negative and significant. The interpretation is that the negative effect of equity lending on fund performance is concentrated among funds in which managers face more investment restrictions. This is consistent with security lending only negatively affecting fund performance when funds are restricted from selling stock holdings even though they observe the shortselling demand signal.
In an alternative test, we examine the effect of security lending on fund performance conditional on whether funds are allowed to trade options or futures, which could be used to hedge the future expected underperformance of the stocks held by the fund with short selling demand. 12 The results in column (2) show that the negative effect of security lending on performance is offset for funds that can trade options or futures. Funds that lend out stocks underperform similar funds by 9.7 basis points, but for those funds that can trade options and futures, the effect on performance is attenuated by 7.9 basis points. So the net effect of security lending on performance for those funds that are less restricted is nearly zero. This evidence is consistent with managers being able to act upon the information signal inherent in borrowing demand when they are less restricted.
An alternative explanation for the negative link between fund performance and security lending is that the income from lending the securities is insufficient to offset the potential adverse effect on the value of the fund's holdings due to agency costs. In a typical security lending arrangement, the lending income is split between the fund investors and the lending agent who facilitates the security lending.
Adams, Mansi, and Nishikawa (2011) find that index funds with an affiliated lending agent earn lower investment returns on lent securities and less of the lending income is shared with the fund investors. If lending through an affiliated lending agent generates income for the fund family, the fund manager might be more inclined to lend in spite of the impact on fund performance because of the benefits for the family through the use of the affiliated lending agent.
In order to explore conflicts of interest as a channel by which security lending might affect fund performance, we gathered information on whether a fund uses an affiliated lending agent from the SEC N-CSR fillings. We examine this channel by looking at the performance differences between funds whose lending arrangements involve an affiliated lending agent and those that only use an unaffiliated lending agent. Column (3) of Table 6 shows that the coefficient of the interaction between the security lending used dummy and the affiliated lending agent dummy is negative, which is consistent with the evidence of a conflict of interest described by Adams, Mansi, and Nishikawa (2011) but the effect is economically and statistically insignificant. Moreover, the negative relation between security lending and performance remains negative and significant after we add the affiliated agent dummy and its interaction to the regression. The interpretation is that the presence of an affiliated lending agent enhances the negative effect of security lending on performance, but there is also a negative and significant effect when no affiliated lending agent is involved. The estimates in column (3) suggest that conflicts of interest cannot explain the negative relation between fund performance and security lending in active funds.
The results are consistent with the idea that fund managers recognize the negative signal about future performance inherent in the short-selling demand for the fund's holdings, but they are limited in their ability to act upon it. In such a case, security lending would at least generate some income improving the fund's performance when the fund manager is restricted to act.
An additional reason why mutual fund families might require some funds to lend their securities is to have better access to the information signal in security lending fees. While market participants can purchase rebate rate data, a family's securities lending operation may generate additional information regarding the identify of clients who are interested in borrowing, individual borrowing transaction data, and information about borrowing transactions that were inquired about or proposed but never concluded.
To the extent that equity lending generates valuable information, families may have some funds lending so that other funds can trade on that signal. Families might allow certain funds to engage in security lending even if this leads to underperformance to maximize their comparative advantage in information acquisition and investing in other funds of the family.
We test for information cross-subsidization within fund families by examining the performance of funds have access to lending information within a family. The lending information dummy takes the value of one if a fund does not lend securities and belongs to a family with at least one fund (active or index) in the same investment objective that lends securities. We run a panel regression of the four-factor alpha on the lending information dummy variable and fund characteristics. If families leak the short selling information to other funds in the family we expect the coefficient on lending information to be positive and significant. Column (4) of Table 6 shows that the lending information coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Funds with access to lending information within the family outperform otherwise similar funds without access to lending information by 3.8 basis points per month.
The results supports the idea that security lending generates positive information externalities to other funds in the same family that attenuate the negative effect on fund performance of security lending.
Manager-Fund Pairs Results
While the results above provide evidence that consistent with family-wide interests, fund managers might be limited in their ability to act upon the information signal. It is difficult to analyze the a manager's reasons for buying or selling a particular stock because we do not know his information set. If we look at the decision of the same manager about the same stock at the same time in two different portfolios, we can effectively control for the manager's information set and better isolate the impact of investment restrictions. By selecting two portfolios from the same manager in which security lending is allowed in one and prohibited in the other, we can analyze how security lending may affect the manager's decision to trade the stock.
To implement this test, we identify a sample of active funds in which at least two funds have the same manager, but security lending is allowed in one fund and is prohibited in the other fund. We then identify those stocks that are held in both funds that become "hard-to-borrow" (i.e., stocks with high short-selling demand and limited borrowing supply). 13 A stock is classified as hard-to-borrow if the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding is greater than 20%. 14 Using quarterly fund holdings around the month when the stock becomes hard-to-borrow, we calculate the change in the number of shares held (as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding) by the manager in each of the two funds and the difference between the two funds.
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Panel A of Table 7 shows that a fund manager decreases his position by 0.109% of shares outstanding when a stock becomes hard-to-borrow in the fund in which security lending is prohibited. In the fund in which securities lending is allowed, the manager only decreases his position in the same stock by 0.054%. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that when a fund manager is prohibited from lending, he is more likely to respond to the short-selling demand signal by 13 D'Avolio (2002) and Nagel (2005) show that short selling is more expensive when institutional ownership is low. Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) show that lending fees are responsive to high short-selling demand. 14 The cutoff of 20% as a proxy for specialness is selected by comparing monthly stock level specialness data from Data Explorers to different cutoffs for the short interest/shares outstanding ratio. While the stock-level specialness data only covers the period from July 2006 to December 2010, we use it to identify the cutoff (across 5% increments) of the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding with the highest correlation to actual specialness. We then apply this cutoff of 20% as our proxy for specialness across the whole sample period (1996 to 2008) . 15 In the case where there are more than two funds for a given manager, we take the average for funds in which security lending is allowed and for funds in which it is prohibited. selling the stock.
To refine the previous test, we split the sample of manager-fund pairs into two groups: funds that are allowed to lend securities but do not actually lend any securities in a given month (Panel B), and funds that are allowed to lend securities and actually lend securities in a given month (Panel C). In both panels, the comparison group remains the twin portfolio of the manager in which security lending is prohibited.
We expect that managers of funds that are allowed to lend but do not actually lend to behave similarly to their restricted portfolio. In contrast, we expect the difference in the position change to be greatest for managers who are allowed to lend and actually lend stocks in a portfolio versus their restricted portfolio.
Panel B shows a statistically insignificant difference in the position change of the fund that is allowed to lend securities but does not lend versus the fund in which security lending is prohibited. Panel C shows that a manager decreases his position when a stock becomes hard-to-borrow by 0.058% of shares outstanding in the fund that lends securities, while the decrease is 0.145% in the fund in which security lending is prohibited. The difference of 0.087% is statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 7 also reports the average expense ratio, total net assets (TNA), age, net flow and whether the fund is subadvised for each group of funds. Panel C shows that the funds in which the manager is less responsive to the short-selling demand signal (funds in which security lending is allowed and used) have lower expense ratios, smaller size, are older, have lower flows, and a higher percentage of them are subadvised. This evidence is consistent with the idea that the funds with security lending programs in place that actually lend securities are less profitable for the fund family.
Overall, the evidence suggests that a manager is less sensitive to the short-selling demand signal when a securities lending program is in place, while the same manager responds more aggressively to the same signal in a fund in which security lending is not allowed.
Family Security Lending Information and Manager Response to Borrowing Demand
The intra-family information cross-subsidization evidences show that funds with access to lending information outperform otherwise similar funds without access to lending information. While we attempt to control for other factors in that analysis, the possibility of an omitted variable remains. In this section, we refine our analysis of whether or not funds from families that have lending information trade on it.
Using holdings data, we first identify across a fund family all stocks that go on "special" and are held by funds that lend securities. While this is a subset of all stocks that go on special, if equity lending provides information about borrowing/short selling demand, these are the securities about which the fund family has unique information. We then identify those funds in the same family that do not lend but hold these stocks that are on special (treated funds) and compare their trading behavior to otherwise similar funds that also hold these stocks and do not lend, but belong to a family that does not have lending information about the stock on special (non-treated funds).
Using propensity score methods, we then match these non-lending funds that potentially learn about the short selling demand for their holdings through this intra-family channel, with non-lending funds that hold the same stock, but that do not have access to this lending information (control funds). Panel A of Table 8 reports the estimates of the probit regression we use to select control funds using propensity score matching methods. Column (1) presents the estimates for the sample of active funds and column (2) presents the estimates for the sample of index funds.
We then compare the trading behavior of funds (treated) that do not lend, but that potentially have access to short selling demand information about their holdings through other funds in the family with funds (control) from other families that do not have access to short selling demand information through their family's security lending operations. Position change is the quarterly change in the number of shares held by the fund (as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding) around the period in which the stock becomes hard-to-borrow if the ratio of short interest to shares outstanding is greater than 20%.
Panel B of Table 8 shows the comparison of the average fund trading and characteristics between the treated and non-treated samples and between the treated and control samples for active funds. Treated funds show a smaller increase in the position (0.022%) compared to non-treated funds (0.088%) when a stock goes on special. The average difference between treated and control funds is also negative at 0.064%, which is statistically significant at a 1% level. This result is consistent with the idea that funds that do not lend securities benefit from other funds in the same family that do lend.
In addition, we repeat the exercise using index funds. Since index funds are passive in their trading approach, if we find similar result in the sample of index funds, it suggests that sharing of short selling demand information across funds in the family does not drive the trading behavior. Panel C of Table 8 shows no difference in position change between treated and control funds in the sample of index funds.
This finding corroborates that fund families leak security lending information to other funds within the family and these funds trade on this information.
Fund Flows Results
Why do fund families restrict funds' investment policies? In order to maximize assets under management, a key determinant of profitability, fund families often diversify their fund offerings across different investment objectives. If an investor in the family's funds redeems his shares due to poor performance or other factors, the family has an alternate investment option to offer him. Successfully retaining the investor's assets in this way can enhance both the level and the stability of fund family profits. If fund managers were given complete flexibility in managing a portfolio, their decisions to purchase securities outside their investment objective or to switch into and out of cash could harm the fund families' overall product strategy of which funds to offer in each investment objective. 16 If the implementation of this family-wide product offering strategy requires managers not deviate much from their designated investment style, regardless of whether or not that style is in favor, a security lending program will at least generate some income to mitigate the potential impact of holding stocks with shortselling demand. In this way the family can build a track record and expertise in each asset class and receive inflows from styles or asset classes favored by investors. Consistent with this idea, in Table 4 we find that families with fund offerings that are well diversified across investment objectives and families 16 For example, anecdotally during the Internet bubble, value funds had underperformed growth funds, and some value managers increased their exposure to growth stocks. When the bubble burst and value funds subsequently outperformed growth funds, these funds that deviated from their investment objective missed that subsequent outperformance. As investors redeemed from growth funds, fund families would have liked to steer those exiting investors into other family funds including their value funds. If the manager of those value funds deviated from their investment style, family profitability could suffer as investors would look for value funds in other fund families.
whose active funds deviate less from their benchmark (i.e., lower active share) are more likely to have security lending programs in place for their actively managed funds.
An additional prediction of this fund family strategy is related to the recapture of fund flows. If security lending programs do complement the family's strategy of diversifying their overall product offerings, these families should be better at retaining assets under management as outflows from a fund in the family will translate into inflows into another fund in the same family. Using the inflow and outflow data from the N-SAR filings, we test this additional prediction. Table 9 shows regression estimates of the relation between fund inflows and outflows and outflows and inflows from all other funds in the family ("Family Outflows" and "Family Inflows"). Columns (1) and (2) report results where the dependent variable is monthly fund inflows, and columns (3) and (4) report results where the dependent variable is monthly fund outflows. The regression controls for other fund characteristics such as performance, expense ratio, size, turnover, and family size. We also control for (lagged) fund inflows and outflows and inflows and outflows into all funds in the same investment objective.
Column (1) shows a positive correlation between a fund's inflows and contemporaneous outflows from other funds in the same family, while column (3) shows a positive correlation between a fund's outflows and contemporaneous inflows from other funds in the same family. In columns (2) and (4), we expand the specifications in columns (1) and (3) to include an interaction of family inflows and outflows with the percentage of a family's funds that allow securities lending ("Security Lending Allowed in Family"). The positive and significant coefficients of the interaction variables in columns (2) and (4) indicate that the family's ability to recapture assets (i.e., outflows from one fund translating into inflows to another fund) increases with the percentage of funds where security lending is allowed. In short, the evidence supports the notion that security lending allows a fund manager to stay close to its investment objective and be consistent with the overall fund family product strategy.
Robustness
So far, we have presented results using a dummy variable that indicates whether a fund lends its stock holdings or not, but it does not take into account what fraction of the portfolio is lent or how much investment income is generated from lending. We find that security lending is negatively associated with fund performance. There is a negative relation between fund performance and lending income in column (1), although the relation with collateral is statistically insignificant in column (2). When including both the collateral as well as security lending income in column (3), the coefficient on collateral becomes positive and significant, while the security lending income coefficient remains negative and significant. A higher collateral value could signify more bargaining power as a lender, leading to better lending terms. 17 Overall, we find that funds that lend perform worse even when we use lending income as explanatory variable.
Conclusion
There is a long literature showing that short-selling demand is a strong signal of the future riskadjusted underperformance of a stock. Because of limits to arbitrage, in particular the costs associated with or the inability to borrow the underlying security, investors are limited in their ability to profit from a strategy of short-selling these stocks. The focus of our paper is not on short-sellers, but rather on the fund managers who own these securities in the first place and lend them. We find that actively managed funds that lend equities underperform otherwise similar funds that do not lend securities, which is consistent with the evidence of future underperformance of securities with short-selling demand. While this result could be driven by omitted variables, we run a number of robustness checks including propensity score matching and find similar results. This raises an important question which we endeavor to answer in this paper: why lend what you can sell?
We explore the potential explanation for the observed underperformance coupled with the increasing popularity of equity lending programs among mutual funds. Indeed, we find that there is a substantial increase in security lending for equity funds in 1996-2008. While the practice of lending shares was limited to less than 25% of the active funds before 2000, the percentage of funds lending their shares increased significantly to 43% by 2008. We find that the negative relation between fund performance and security lending appears to be explained by the idea that fund family profit maximization considerations dominate individual fund performance considerations. We find that funds that lend securities are from larger fund families with fund offerings that are well diversified across investment objectives. Moreover, we find that the underperformance is concentrated among funds with greater investment restrictions.
The interpretation is that fund managers are limited in their ability to sell the stock when they receive the short-selling demand signal due to investment restrictions in line with the fund families' overall product strategy of which funds to offer in each investment objective. We also find evidence consistent with cross-family subsidization through sharing of the short selling signal within the fund family. The investment restrictions and the cross-subsidization of information within fund families explain why fund managers are reluctant to sell what they can lend. In this way, stock lending will at least generate some income that minimizes the effects of future stock underperformance.
We conclude that the decision to allow security lending by mutual funds has important implications for fund performance. While lending fees can be an additional source of income to the fund, the decision to hold stocks with strong short-selling demand can negatively affect future fund performance. Mutual fund boards and fund managers should consider this potential trade-off when making decisions about security lending programs. This paper contributes to the understanding of the consequences of security lending for fund performance and helps to shed light on the issue of why fund families initiate security lending programs and why such programs may be detrimental to individual fund performance. 
Table 2 Frequency of Security Lending by Mutual Funds
Panel A reports the number of active and index equity funds that are allowed and engage in security lending by year. The sample consists of equity mutual funds with N-SAR filings and CRSP mutual funds data over the 1996-2008 period. Panel B reports the transition probabilities for the security lending allowed and security lending used states. Refer to Table A This table reports estimates of ordinary least squares and fixed effects regressions of the Carhart four-factor alphas (in percentage per month) on the security lending used dummy and lagged fund characteristics for active funds (Panel A) and index funds (Panel B). The sample consists of equity mutual funds with N-SAR filings and CRSP mutual funds data over the 1996-2008 period. Refer to Table A.2 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust tstatistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A: Active Funds (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Table 4 Probit of Security Lending Used
This table reports estimates of probit regression of the fund decision to lend securities using lagged fund and family characteristics as explanatory variables. A control sample of funds is constructed using the fund in the same month and style with the closest propensity score to the treated fund. For active funds, style is determined by the fund's membership in one of the Morningstar investment objective categories. For index funds, style is determined by the stated benchmark the index fund tracks. The sample consists of active and indexed equity mutual funds with N-SAR filings and CRSP mutual funds data over the 1996-2008 period. Regressions (1) and (2) are the active fund sample and regressions (3) and (4) This table reports the comparison of fund performance and other variables between the treated (funds that lend equities), non-treated and control samples. The control sample of funds is constructed using the fund in the same month and style with the closest propensity score to the treated fund where the propensity scores are determined by the probit regressions (2) and (4) of Table 4 for active and index funds respectively. For active funds, style is determined by the fund's membership in one of the Morningstar investment objective categories. For index funds, style is determined by the stated benchmark the index fund tracks. Panel A gives the results for active funds and Panel B gives the results for index funds. The differences are given for the variables used in the probit model of Table 4 and the difference in the Carhart four-factor alphas (in percentage per month) between the treated and control fund groups. The sample consists of active and index equity mutual funds with N-SAR filings and CRSP mutual funds data over the 1996-2008 period. Refer to Table A .2 in the Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. This table reports an analysis of a sample of 139 active fund managers who manage two or more funds at the same time in which a fund(s) is allowed to lend securities and the other fund(s) is prohibited. Position change is the quarterly change in the number of shares held by the fund (as fraction of shares outstanding) around the period in which the stock becomes hard-to-borrow as proxied by below median institutional ownership (limited supply) and top quartile short interest (excess shorting demand). The table also report mean fund characteristics of the two group of funds managed by the same manager. Panel A shows the results for all manager-stock-fund pairs. Panels B and C report statistics for the subsamples where the funds that are allowed to lend do not lend (Panel B) and do lend (Panel C). The sample consists of active equity mutual funds with N-SAR filings and CRSP mutual funds data over the 1996-2008 period. Refer to Table A.2 in the Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. This table reports the comparison between non-lending (treated) funds that have information about stock holdings that go on special through other funds in the family that lend and own the stock and non-lending funds (non-treated) that hold the same stock but do not have access to the information through the family. The control sample of funds is constructed using the fund with the closest propensity score to the treated fund with scores given by the probit regression in Panel A. Position change is the quarterly change in the number of shares held by the fund (as fraction of shares outstanding) around the period in which the stock becomes hard-to-borrow as proxied by below median institutional ownership (limited supply) and top quartile short interest (excess shorting demand). Panel B reports the comparison for active funds and Panel B reports the comparison for index funds. The sample consists of equity mutual funds with N-SAR filings and CRSP mutual funds data over the 1996-2008 period. Refer to Table A.2 in the Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The fund inflow and outflow data come from N-SAR question 28a-f. The independent variables include the lagged fund inflows and outflows (Fund Inflows and Outflows), average inflows and outflows to all funds in the same investment objective (Style Inflows and Outflows), average inflows and outflows to all other funds in the fund family (Family Inflows and Outflows), and the fraction of funds in the family that are allowed to lend securities (Security Lending Allowed in Family). The sample consists of active equity mutual funds with N-SAR filings and CRSP mutual funds data from fund families with at least 10 funds across all investment objectives over the 1996-2008 period. Refer to Table A.2 in the Appendix for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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